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instruments. Both instruments may in practice be imperfect, reflecting informational deficiencies and 
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I. Introduction 
Both taxes and direct regulation are used to discourage behaviour that gives rise to externalities. For 
example,  most  European  countries  levy  significant  taxes  on  cigarettes,  and  these  are  frequently 
justified in terms of the costs that cigarette smokers impose on others - including the ill-health and 
annoyance caused by passive smoking, and the costs of collectively-financed health care. In parallel, 
many countries have also introduced various forms of direct regulation with similar goals - such as the 
bans on smoking in workplaces and other public spaces introduced in recent years in Norway, Ireland, 
the UK and elsewhere. This paper looks at the economic issues which arise when externality taxes and 
direct regulation are used in parallel. When would the combined use of both instruments be justified - 
in the sense of achieving outcomes which are better than could be achieved using one instrument 
alone? And what are the implications of changes in one instrument for the optimal level at which the 
other should be set? How, for example, does the introduction of an additional legal restriction on 
smoking affect the optimal level of the externality tax on cigarettes? 
 
Most economic analysis of externality taxes and regulation has focussed on the two approaches as 
alternatives.  In  environmental  policy,  for  example,  economists  have  emphasised  the  efficiency 
advantages  of  using  “market  mechanisms”  such  as  emissions  taxes  or  tradable  pollution  permits 
compared with the traditional approach of direct “command-and-control” regulations requiring the use 
of particular production or abatement technologies, or setting limits on emissions.  Sandmo (2000) 
expressed the conventional view of economists in the following words: “Economists have traditionally 
been sceptical about policy by persuasion, hostile to command and control policies and enthusiastic 
about market based instruments”. Where polluters differ in costs of abatement, the flexibility offered 
by  market  mechanisms  reduces  the  aggregate  cost  of  achieving  a  given  reduction  in  emissions 
compared  with  uniformly-applied  regulation  of  abatement  technologies  or  emissions  levels.  This 
argument is, however, underpinned by implicit assumptions about instrument imperfection. Under 
conditions of full information, costless implementation and certainty, an equivalent first-best outcome 
can be achieved by either command-and-control regulation, or a market mechanism.   3 
 
Information costs and asymmetries are central to the instrument choice debate. Regulated firms may 
know  much  more  about  the  costs  of  changing  pollution  than  the  regulator,  but  will  also  have 
incentives not to reveal this information. C&C regulation may be compelled to treat firms the same 
when in fact they differ, while market mechanisms allow for differential responses. 
 
Costs of information and monitoring also underlie the choice between various different forms that 
regulation can take. Compliance with bans, or with regulations mandating the installation of particular 
technologies, may be relatively cheap to monitor, which may account for much of the prevalence of 
these inflexible forms of regulation. Likewise, the operating costs of market mechanisms such as 
emissions taxes may influence the choice, and the design, of such instruments.  Often it may be 
cheaper to tax emission proxies (such as the use of a particular input) than to tax measured emissions. 
 
The upshot is that, in practice, the range of policy options available typically comprises a set of 
instruments  characterised  by  various  practical  compromises.  None  of  the  available  instruments  is 
alone capable of implementing the first-best.  We may want to ask which instrument gets closer to the 
first-best.  But  if  both  are  sufficiently  imperfect,  we  may  also  be  interested  in  the  properties  of 
instrument combinations, in which two instruments are used to offset each others’ weaknesses. 
 
The  literature  on  the  economics  of  instrument  combinations  is  much  more  limited  than  that  on 
either/or instrument choice.  Eskeland (1994) considers how an excise tax and regulation could be 
combined to mimic an otherwise-impracticable vehicle emissions fee. Innes (1996) models the effect 
on motor vehicle emissions of a wider range of instrument combinations. Hoel (1997) observes that 
the complexity of environmental problems, and the limitations of instrument design, typically mean 
that efficient regulation of road transport requires tax instruments to be combined with various other 
forms  of  regulation.  Fullerton  and  Wolverton  (1999)  consider  multi-part  instruments,  in  which, 
typically, taxes and subsidies are combined to achieve an outcome closer to the first-best than either 
could alone.   4 
 
A parallel discussion concerns the relative merits of regulation by prices and by quantities. Weitzman 
(1974) showed that when there is uncertainty about the costs of pollution abatement the outcomes 
from regulation which sets a pollution price will differ from regulation which fixes the pollution 
quantity; the conditions under which one is superior to the other depend on the sensitivity of marginal 
abatement costs and marginal pollution damage to the emissions level.  A case for combining elements 
of both approaches is made by Roberts and Spence (1976), who show that quantity regulation with 
upper and lower price “safety valves” can eliminate the extreme outcomes associated with pure price 
or quantity regulation. In a similar vein, Mandell (2004) has argued that when there is abatement cost 
uncertainty regulating some sectors by price and others by quantity may be preferable to uniform 
application of one or other approach to the whole economy. 
 
In this paper we seek to characterise the circumstances in which combinations of tax and regulation 
may be required for efficient  correction of some simple externality problems under conditions of 
certainty. The cases we consider all take the form of consumption externalities generated by individual 
consumption behaviour (although much of the underlying logic would also apply to externalities from 
production  activities).  We  also  basically  confine  our  attention  to  situations  where  the  purpose  of 
taxation is to correct the externality; this allows us to abstract from the differences between taxes and 
direct regulation that reflect the value of the tax contribution to government revenues (the "double 
dividend" issue).  
 
Our point of departure is the same as the literature on imperfect externality-correcting taxes (Sandmo, 
1976, Green and Sheshinski, 1976), namely that the tax instruments available are somehow imperfect 
or inadequate. We consider situations where the available tax instruments can be supplemented with 
some  form  of  direct  regulation  which  is,  likewise,  imperfect,  and  therefore  incapable  alone  of 
implementing the first-best. 
    5 
Following this introduction, the paper is in three main sections. In Section II we discuss the nature of 
the instrument imperfections which underpin the case for combined use of both tax and regulation. In 
Section  III  we  consider  cases  where  the  tax  instrument  is  incapable  of  differentiating  efficiently 
between activities generating different levels of externality. For example, the tax on motor fuel cannot 
differentiate between fuel used to drive in congested road-space and fuel used for journeys which do 
not add to traffic congestion. We analyse the effect of combining direct regulation with the imperfect 
externality tax, and consider how direct regulation alters the optimal externality tax. In Section IV we 
then address an alternative source of imperfection, where the externality tax cannot be applied to all 
sources of the externality - for example, because some of the externality-generating goods can be 
purchased  on  the  black  market  or  imported  without  paying  domestic  tax.  Again  we  consider  the 
implications of adding direct regulation to the instrument mix. Section V briefly draws attention to 
some further issues largely neglected in the previous parts. Section VI draws some conclusions 
 
 
II. Imperfections in Taxes and Regulation 
 
In considering tax and regulation combinations we are interested in cases where both instruments 
depart  from  the  ideal  in  some  respect.  In  this  section  we  describe,  in  turn, the  various forms  of 
instrument imperfection that may affect externality taxes and direct regulation, identifying some cases 
which we then model in subsequent sections. 
 
The existing literature on imperfect externality-correcting taxes has observed that most of the available 
tax instruments are based on a proxy for the externality, such as the sale of a good, rather than the 
externality itself (Sandmo, 1976; Green and Sheshinski, 1976). To the extent that the tax base is not a 
perfect proxy for the externality, externality taxes involve inefficiency, arising from the imperfect 
targeting of the incentive.  
   6 
To explore this idea further we could distinguish between three forms of externality tax. Taxes may be 
imposed on 
 
(1)  the measured externality 
  eg a congestion charge levied per km travelled at the marginal congestion externality 
 
(2)  consumption of a good which generates the externality 
  eg a tax on motor fuel, set at a level to reflect the marginal congestion externality 
 
(3)  consumption of goods which are related to the externality-creating good 
  eg a tax on urban parking spaces, or a subsidy (negative tax) to public transport. 
 
In analysing the use of commodity taxes to correct externalities, Green and Sheshinski (1976), Balcer 
(1980) and Wijkander (1985) refer to case (2) as a "direct" externality tax and case (3) as an "indirect" 
externality tax. The precise distinction being drawn is not always clear, and may amount to no more 
than that between a close proxy for the externality and weaker proxies. A sharper distinction could be 
drawn between a good which always generates the externality when consumed, and other goods which 
may be complements to or substitutes for consumption of this good. 
 
A  tax  on  measured  emissions  could,  in  principle,  achieve  the  first-best  if  levied  at  the  marginal 
external cost of each unit of emissions. But direct measurement of emissions and unit charging for the 
externality may be technically infeasible or excessively costly, and measured-emissions taxes are rare 
in  practice.  Even  those  which  do  exist  may  not  be  optimally-differentiated  to  reflect  the  precise 
marginal external cost associated with each unit of emissions. 
 
Where the tax is not based directly on emissions or a perfect emissions proxy, there will tend to be 
inefficiency in the pattern of behavioural responses. Polluters will economise on use of the taxed 
commodity, but do not directly face an incentive to cut emissions. Costs may be incurred in reducing   7 
consumption in ways which do not reduce emissions. Likewise, possibilities for reducing emissions 
without  reducing  consumption  will  be  ignored.  In  particular,  there  will  be  no  incentive  to  use 
abatement technologies to alter the link between the taxed commodity and emissions. If we use the 
term  “abatement”  rather  narrowly  to  refer  to  the  use  of  such  technologies,  we  can  see  that  the 
inefficiency of taxes based on an emissions proxy rather than directly on emissions will consist in the 
fact that the first-best emissions tax leads to “consumption” and “abatement” responses, while the 
proxy encourages “consumption” responses alone. 
 
Externality taxes levied on goods will typically differ from the first-best externality tax for one of 
three main reasons: 
 
  It will frequently be much less costly to make use of existing tax bases (eg sales taxes or 
VAT) than to introduce wholly-new externality taxes. However, existing taxes are typically 
based on the value of sales, and this may be a poorer proxy for external costs than would be a 
separate excise tax on the quantity sold.  
 
  Even where externality taxation can take the form of an excise tax on physical quantities of 
the good, and the design of the tax is unconstrained by the need for compatibility with existing 
tax  arrangements,  administrative  costs  may  limit  the  extent  to  which  the  tax  can  be 
differentiated to reflect the level of externality associated with each use. Moderate levels of 
alcohol  consumption  may  for  example  be  fairly  harmless  while  heavy  drinking  by  some 
individuals generates large and progressively-increasing externalities. However, it may not be 
possible to identify those sales liable to generate large external costs, or to levy non-linear 
taxes  on  individual  purchasers.  A  uniform  tax  may  be  employed,  because  an  optimally-
differentiated tax would be excessively costly or infeasible. 
 
  Some  externality-generating  consumption  of  a  good  may  escape  taxation  because  some 
sources  of  acquisition  are  not  subject  to  domestic  taxation.  For  example,  goods  may  be   8 
directly imported by cross-border shoppers or purchased on an untaxed black market. The tax 
will then distort the choice between the taxed and untaxed sources of supply.  Where a large 
tax generates a large deadweight loss, combining a lower tax and a (costly) regulation may be 
preferable to relying solely on a tax.  
 
In brief, a tax can be imperfect because of imperfect targeting, insufficient differentiation or failure to 
avoid differentiation where it is not desirable. In each of these cases the question is whether there is a 
role for regulation supplementing a tax.  
 
Regulations can be of many different kinds. Common examples in environmental policy are fixed 
quantitative  limits  on  emissions  or  the  mandatory  use  of  abatement  technologies.    Regulating 
externalities generated by consumption typically uses rather different instruments, including various 
restrictions on sale or consumption.  In  many cases, consumption regulation can be interpreted as 
increasing the real cost of acquisition, or reducing the quality of the commodity consumed. Regulation 
restricts alcohol consumption by restricting the outlets where it can be sold and by limiting opening 
hours,  adding  inconvenience  costs  to  the  cost  of  consumer  purchases.  The  utility  derived  from 
consumption may be reduced by restrictions on where and when goods can be consumed, in a way 
similar to a reduction in quality. Thus, for example, restrictions on smoking in offices and restaurants 
mean that cigarettes have to be consumed outside, and road traffic restrictions on driving in specific 
areas or at certain times reduce the convenience of car travel. 
 
We can, in addition, draw a distinction between two types of consumption regulation, differing in how 
the impact on the externality arises. The first form of regulation works solely by reducing utility from 
each unit of the good consumed. The impact on the externality arises through the effect on the level of 
consumption alone – much the same response as would be achieved by using a consumption tax as an 
emissions proxy. The second form of regulation mandates the use of “abatement – in other words, 
requires  consumers  to  bear  an  additional  cost  when  consuming  the  good,  that  has  the  effect  of 
reducing the externality from the units consumed. Typically regulation of this sort will have responses   9 
of two kinds – both “abatement” and “consumption” responses as discussed above. The scale of the 
consumption response relative to the abatement response will depend on the cost of abatement, and its 
relationship to the number of units consumed. This could in principle have various functional forms – 
a fixed cost per consumer, a constant cost per unit consumed, or more complex relationships. 
 
Imperfection in taxation is in a fundamental sense the justification for using regulation at all. One 
might think that if we can observe something sufficiently accurately to regulate it then we could tax it. 
If we can ban the sale of alcohol at particular times of the day, then we can, in principle, levy a tax on 
any such sales sufficient to reflect the externality involved, and this would appear to offer everything 
that the regulation can, with the added benefit of cost-reducing flexibility. In our view, the case for 
using regulation at all rests on the costs or impracticality of operating first-best externality taxes. 
While regulation might always be dominated by a theoretical first-best tax, the practically-available 
tax instruments may have inadequacies that make regulation preferable. Two issues, in particular, 
seem to be important. 
  One is that externalities may often be non-linear in consumption, in various ways, and poorly 
approximated by uniform taxes on consumption. Thus, for example, requiring bars to close at 
a particular hour may limit public drunkenness, and while an increasing tax on each drink 
purchased - or even higher taxes on all drinks sold late at night - might in theory be able to 
achieve the same outcome with greater flexibility, neither could be implemented by modifying 
current excises, which tax alcoholic drinks well before the retail stage. Regulation may be 
better than a higher alcohol excise, even though neither is ideal. Time-of-day or purchaser-
specific  alcohol  taxes  would  require  much  more  complex  administration,  and  would  be 
exposed to various forms of avoidance, including resale, which could be hard to prevent. 
Restrictions increasing the real cost of acquiring the good may barely affect consumers who 
make small and infrequent purchases but have a substantial impact on large consumers and 
thus mimic a non-linear tax.  
  The second attraction of regulation is that frequently a prohibition on some activity may be 
much cheaper to monitor and enforce than any other limit. Zero activity can be more readily   10 
monitored than any other level, in the sense that any activity demonstrates non-compliance. 
Enforcing any other limit than zero would typically require more complex investigation and 
record-keeping. 
 
Nevertheless,  the  distinction  between  regulations  and  the  use  of  taxes  or  other  market-based 
instruments is not always clear-cut. A strict regulation may be imposed by making the installation of a 
certain abatement technology mandatory. A similar but less rigid policy would be to let installation be 
voluntary but to impose a tax on those who do not opt for the abatement technology. The advantage 
would be that the technology would not be adopted in cases where it is overly costly and socially 
undesirable but where the regulator would have sparse knowledge about costs. While the tax approach 
may appear to be the more efficient alternative it will also be more costly as, beyond monitoring the 
technology,  one  will  have  to  determine  the  tax  liability  and  collect  taxes  in  each  case  while  the 
regulation alternative will only require action to impose sanctions in the - conceivably few - instances 
of non-compliance.  
 
 
 III. Imperfect Differentiation  
 
As discussed above, an ideal tax is one that taxes the externality directly according to the marginal 
external cost. Where the external cost is determined solely by consumption the amount consumed 
would be a perfect proxy for the externality, and a commodity tax would achieve the same allocation 
as an externality tax. However, total consumption may be a too crude measure. One may need to 
distinguish between consumption at different times, in different locations, by different people, and in 
various other circumstances as the external cost may vary according to all these characteristics. This 
section addresses the case where the tax cannot be differentiated according to this kind of variation.  
 
Let  a  single  consumer  represent  a  homogeneous  population.  There  are  two  consumption  goods. 
Denote quantities by c and x. The latter good can be consumed in two different activities labelled 1   11 
and 2, respectively (which may also be interpreted as locations or time periods). The quantities 
1 x  and 




2() ex. Assuming a quasi-linear utility function
1 we can 







2() ex                                                                                    (1) 
where  the  following  properties  are  assumed: 
'1 ( ) 0 fx   , 
'' 1 ( ) 0 fx , 
2 '( ) 0 gx , 
2 ''( ) 0 gx , 
'1
1( ) 0 ex , 
'' 1
1( ) 0 ex , 
'2
2( ) 0 ex , 
'' 2
2( ) 0 ex . 
 
The consumer is assumed to have a fixed income or endowment w. The cost of producing a unit of 
x is  p  which in a competitive market equilibrium equals the producer price. Let us assume that two 
externality-correcting instruments are available. One is a (uniform) tax on x, denoted t. The other is a 
regulation of activity  1. The  regulation, represented  by  a  parameter  r, reduces  the  utility  derived 
from
1 x ,  which  we  now  write  as
1 ( , ) f x r .  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  the  nature  of  the 
regulation is to degrade the circumstances in which the good is acquired or consumed. We assume that 
'1
2( , ) 0 f x r  and 
'' 1
12( , ) 0 f x r  which means that tightening regulation will depress total as well as 
marginal  utility  of  consuming  the  good  in  question. We  may  note  that  an  abatement  requirement 
would have the same effect to the extent that the loss of utility is incurred because the consumer is 
forced to spend resources on abatement but abatement would also have the further effect that it would 
diminish emissions for given consumption so there would be a shift in 
1
1() ex . We return to this issue 
in Section 5.  
 
We can write the budget constraint of the consumer as  
12 ( )( ) w T c p t x x                                                                                                                  (2) 
where T is a lump-sum transfer used to recycle any government revenue to the consumer 
                                                 
1 Assuming quasi-linearity is an innocuous assumption as, roughly speaking, substitution effects will prevail in 
optimal tax formulas as income effects tend to cancel out where tax revenue is returned to the tax payers via 
transfers.     12 
so that 
12 () T t x x . 
Allowing for regulation, we can write the utility function as  
V=c+
1 ( , ) f x r +
2 () gx 1
1 () ex  2
2 () ex.                                                                                            (3) 
The representative consumer, being a “small” agent in the market, maximises utility subject to the 
budget constraint, treating the externalities, the price and the government instruments as exogenous. 
The following first order conditions obtain  
'1
1( , ) f x r p t                                                                                                                                    (4)  
2 '( ) g x p t                                                                                                                                        (5) 
implying the demand functions  
1( , ) x p t r and
2() x p t .                                                                                                                     (6) 
 
Simple  comparative  statics  yield  the  effects  of the  instruments  on  the  consumer’s  demand.  It  is 







p x t x p x
f x r










For a change in r, a stricter regulation, we find  
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                                                                                                                (7) 
 
Allowing  for  the  government  instruments  and  making  use  of  (2)  and (3),  we  can  express  the 
consumer’s utility as    13 
1 2 1 1 2 2
12 ( ( , ), ) ( ( )) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ) ( ( )) V f x p t r r g x p t w px p t r e x p t r px p t e x p t
                                                                                                                                                                (8) 
 
Let us begin by considering the optimal tax and regulation in this framework. Suppose that initially 
welfare is maximised with respect to the tax rate implying the first order condition 
 
' 1 2 ' 1 ' 2
1 1 2 ' ( ) ( ) t p p p p V f x g x p e x p e x =0                                                                                   (9) 
 
and the second order condition  
0 tt V                                                                                                                                                   (10) 
where  single  and  double  subscripts  are  used  to  denote  first  and  second  derivatives,  respectively. 
Invoking  the  first  order  conditions  of  the  consumer’s  maximisation,  we  can  write  the  first  order 
condition for t as 
 
1 2 ' 1 ' 2
12 ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) p p p p tx p t r tx p t e x p t r e x p t =0                                                                (11)  
 
from which we get the formula  
 
' 1 ' 2
12
12
( , ) ( )
( , ) ( )
pp
pp
e x p t r e x p t
t
x p t r x p t
                                                                                                          (12) 
 
(12)  is  of  the  same  form  as    the  well -known  weighted  average  formula  of  Diamond  (1973) 
characterising the optimal uniform tax rate on activities that generate non-uniform external costs in the 
absence of regulation. Thus we have demonstrated that the weighted average formula for the tax holds 
also in this model where regulation is also present, but we note that  regulation will normally change 
the weights. 
   14 
Turning to regulation and differentiating welfare with respect to the regulation parameter we obtain  
' 1 ' ' 1 ' 1 '
1 2 1 1 2 ( ) ( ) r r r r V f x f p e x t e x f                                                                                      (13) 
where the latter equation is due to (4) 
 
Starting out from an unregulated situation, (stricter) regulation will be worthwhile if the sign of (13) is 
positive. For this to happen the marginal external cost of good 1, 
'
1 e , must exceed the tax rate, t, and 
the  marginal real  cost  of regulation,
'
2 f ,  must  not  be  too  large. Since  the  tax  rate  is  a  weighted 
average of the marginal social costs of the two goods the good that should be regulated is the one with 
the larger marginal social cost.  
 
Consider now how tighter regulation will affect the tax rate. Starting out from the first order condition, 
standard comparative statics yields  
 
1 '
' ' '' 1 1 1




V f p e e x x
dr r r
                                                                               (14) 
 
Making use of the condition 
'





, and accordingly 
1
' '' 1 1








' '' 1 1
11 ( ) / /
p
tt r p tt
x dt
e t V e x x V
dr r
                  (15) 
 
We know that 
'
1 0 et ,  0 tt V ,
1 0 r x ,
1 0 p x . Accordingly, the former term on the right hand side 
has the sign of 
1 () p x
r
. The partial effect of a steeper demand schedule is to decrease the tax rate. As 
we see from (12), the larger marginal external cost is then given less weight in the tax formula. Effects   15 
are opposite where regulation makes the demand curve flatter. Where the demand causing the more 
serious externality becomes more (less) price responsive the tax obviously becomes a more (less) 
efficient instrument for diminishing the externality. The latter term on the right hand side is strictly 
negative where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption. This is natural as  stricter 
regulation will discourage consumption and lower the marginal external cost and accordingly the 
externality-correcting tax.   
 
We can sum up our results so far.  
 
Proposition 1  
  Where a Pigouvian tax is supplemented by regulation it is the consumption causing the larger 
marginal external cost that should be regulated.   
  Where    marginal  external  costs  and  the  price  responsiveness  of  demand  schedules  are 
constant tighter regulation leaves the tax rate unchanged.  
  Where  the  marginal  external  effect  is  increasing  (non-decreasing)  in  consumption  and 
regulation makes demand no more (less) price responsive the effect of stricter regulation is to lower 
the tax rate. 
  Where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption and regulation makes demand 
more price responsive there are ambiguous effects on the tax rate. 
 
In general, regulations can be of many types and it is hard to impose further restrictions on the f-
function. However, it may be helpful to consider special cases. Assume first that 
1 1 1 ( , ) ( ) f x r h x rx .                                                                                                                        (16) 
 
' 1 1
1( , ) '( ) f x r h x r p t                                                                                                              (17) 
 
1 '( ) h x p t r                                                                                                                                 (18)   16 
 



























                                                                                                                              (21) 
 
The characteristic of this case is that regulation has the same effect on demand as the price. We can 
conceive of a number of cases where this may be  a plausible description. Suppose the regulation 
requires spending real resources in addition to the monetary expenses in order to acquire or consume 
the good. Then the cost of each unit of consumption will increase. Suppose the regulation is to lower 
speed limits on a road. Then the cost of travelling will increase in terms of time.  
 
A common assumption in demand analysis is that h’’’ 0and 
1 0 pp x .
2 In this case a price increase 
and  a  stricter  regulation  will  both  make  the  demand  schedule  steeper  and  re duce  the  price 
responsiveness. Alternatively, a linear demand schedule is often considered where the slope of the 
demand schedule is constant.  
 
Other  specifications  may treat the regulation as   reducing the quality of the good. Conceivable 
specifications are 
11 ( , ) ( / ) f x r h x r  or 
11 ( , ) (1 ) f x r h r x . In these cases the assumption that 
h’’’>0 implies that r will have ambiguous effects on the slope of the demand schedule.  
 
Now consider the full optimum where both the tax rate and the regulation have been optimised so that   
                                                 
2 This might be suggested by the analogy with the expected utility function and the property of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion.    17 
 
' 1 2 ' 1 ' 2
1 1 2 ' ( ) ( ) t p p p p V f x g x p e x p e x =0                                                                                 (22) 
 
' 1 ' ' 1
1 2 1 ( ) 0 r r r V f x f p e x                                                                                                          (23) 
 
Owing to  (4) 
 
' 1 '




1 0 et . Alternatively, we can write 
 
' 1 '
12 ( ) ( , ) r e e x p t r f =0                                                                                                               (25) 
 
where  e is the weighted average in (12). It is important to note that 
'
1 e t e  which confirms that 
regulation will be applied to the activity with the larger externality.  
 
By standard comparative statics we can examine how the policy mix depends on the external effect. 
Consider  now  the  case  where  marginal  external  costs  are  constant: 
1 1 1
1() e x x   where 
1  is a 
parameter. Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to  1 and denoting derivatives by 
means of a prime we find  
 
1 '' tt tr p V t V r x                                                                                                                                     (26) 
 
1 '' rt rr r V t V r x                                                                                                                                     (27)   18 
To simplify, let us assume that third derivatives of f and g are zero and accordingly 
1
p x  and 
1
r x  are 
constant. Since 
'1


















>0                                                                                                                                            (29) 
 
since by second order conditions  0 tt V and  0 rr V .  
 
The tax rate is larger, and the optimal regulation is tighter the larger is the more serious externality. In 
a similar way we find by differentiating w.r.t.  2 that the tax rate will increase and the regulation is 
left unchanged in response to an increase in  2. 
 
If instead we assume that the marginal external cost is increasing and there is a constant positive shift 
in  the  marginal  external cost  generated  by  1 x   regulation  will  become  tighter  while  there  are 
ambiguous effects on the tax rate. On the one hand the shift in the externality is an argument for a 
larger  tax,  but  as  the  tighter  regulation  depresses  the  marginal  external  cost  the  net  effect  is 
indeterminate.   
 
So far we have assumed that the regulation does not affect the demand for the unregulated good 2. Let 
us now consider the case of cross-effects so that a stricter regulation will shift some demand from 
good 1 to good 2. The utility function can be written  
U=c+




2() ex .                                                                                                 (30)   19 
In general it is hard to know how the slopes of demand schedules will change and hence how the 
weights in (12) will change so let us consider the case of constant weights.  
 
12
' ' ' '
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
pp
p p p p
xx
t e e we w e
x x x x
                                                                                          (31) 
where 1 w  and  2 w  are the weights defined by the latter equation.        
 
Cross effects on demand will imply that
1 0 r x , 
2 0 r x , and plausibly the former change is larger in 
absolute  value than the latter. (The reduced consumption in market 1 is not fully offset by increased 
consumption in market 2.) 
 
'' 1 '' 2
1 1 2 2 rr t we x w e x
r
                                                                                                                        (32) 
  
The change in the tax rate will depend on the extent to which reduced demand for good 1 generates 
increased demand for good 2, on the weights, and on the changes in the marginal external costs. 
Circumstances that are conducive to a larger tax rate are that the marginal external cost curve of good 
2 is steeper than that of good 1, cross effects on demand are strong, and the weight of good 2 is large.  
 
If regulating smoking in public places diverts smoking to other places and strongly drives up the 
marginal external cost there a larger tax is needed to reflect the larger external cost in the unregulated 
place. However, if the other place is not much affected or the regulation even induces people to give 
up smoking altogether the optimal tax will be lowered.  
 
Beyond cross effects on demand, there may be cross effects on the external costs where the marginal 
cost is not constant. There may not only be an external cost from each activity but there may also be 
external costs which depend on the total consumption. The combination of a general external cost and 
activity specific externalities might be expressed as e(
1 x  + 
2 x ) + 
1
1() ex + 
2
2() ex. For instance,   20 
smoking may not only impose passive smoking on others at various times and places but there may be 
external  costs  owing  to  health  effects  which  are  related  to  the  smoking  record  of  a  person 
independently  of  the  circumstances  in  which  the  smoking  took  place.  If  there  is  no  shifting  of 
consumption from one activity to the other a restriction lowering consumption in one activity will then 
lower the marginal external cost in both activities and there is a case for lowering the tax. If there is 
some but less than fully offsetting increase in consumption in the other activity there will be opposing 
effects. The marginal “general” externality will decline but the other activity-specific externality, if 
present, will increase at the margin. Where restrictions on smoking in public induce people to smoke 
less altogether but more at home where there is no specific externality there is a case for lowering the 
tax.  
 
A ban on an activity.  
A “soft” regulation of the type above is not always feasible. One might like to directly restrict the 
consumption  of  a  good  in  a  particular  place,  say  restricting  the  amount  of  smoking,  drinking, 
motorised traffic, burning coal, etc. One might like everybody to cut down consumption by thirty or 
fifty percent to alleviate the externality, but this restriction is hard to enforce where the level of 
consumption cannot be exactly monitored. The only regulation that can be enforced may be a ban, as 
the regulator will then only need to observe that somebody is consuming the good in order to know 
that the regulation is being violated. Subject to this constraint the cost benefit problem is whether 
cutting back the externality outweighs the loss of consumer’s surplus inflicted by the ban (and the cost 
of the regulator). Suppose a ban on activity i is socially desirable. Then activity i will be abandoned 
and the tax is determined by equating it to the marginal external cost of activity j (where ji ). A ban 
will raise or lower the tax depending on which activity that is being banned. This is not obvious. Even 
if activity A causes the larger externality per unit, we don’t know in which activity the external cost 
exceeds the consumer’s surplus. (We suppose that this does not happen in both activities, which would 
justify banning the good altogether.) Thus even if a “soft” regulation will always be targeted at the 
activity with the larger marginal external cost, this need not be the case with a ban (even if we imagine 
it will often be the case).    21 
 
IV. Unwanted Differentiation – Tax Avoidance by Cross-border Shopping   
 
Sometimes  there  may  be  cases  in  which  uniform  taxation  is  difficult  to  implement,  even  when 
desirable, because the tax may be avoided in parts of the market. To fix ideas we shall consider a 
regime where the domestic tax may be avoided by purchasing the good in question abroad, but the 
example may be interpreted as representing more general cases. The important feature of the analysis 
is that the tax can be avoided at a real resource cost. In this sense our analysis is akin to the literature 
on risk-free but costly tax avoidance
3. While cross-border shopping is chosen as a specific example it 
is also a case of major importance in many countries where consumers go abroad (or to other states in 
the US) to buy goods many of which are supposed to generate externalities (alcohol, tobacco, petrol).  
 
Suppose that an amount x of a good is purchased at home at a price p+t and an amount z is purchased 
abroad at a retail price q and a (travel, etc.) cost k(z), where k’>0, k’’>0. The budget constraint is  
( ) ( ) w T c p t x qz k z                                                                                                 (33)    
where w is an exogenous income, and T is a lump-sum transfer used to return any government revenue 
to the consumer and perceived as exogenous by the consumer. Hence, T=tx.  
 
As  before,  our  notion  of  regulation  is  that  it  imposes  a  real  cost  of  consuming  the  externality-
generating good. The utility function of a representative agent is  
U=c+ ( , ) f x z r  =  ( ) ( ) w T p t x qz k z + ( , ) f x z r                                                 (34) 
The benefit derived from consuming x+z  is increasing in consumption and decreasing in regulation 
and the marginal benefit is assumed to be decreasing in consumption and in strictness of regulation, r. 
In mathematical terms 
'
1 f >0, 
'
2 f <0, 
'
11 0 f , 
''
12 0 f . 
 
The first order conditions of the consumer’s maximisation are 
                                                 
3 The idea is that by incurring a real resource cost, which is increasing in the amount of evasion/avoidance, a 
share of the tax base can be sheltered from taxation. See for example Boadway et al. (1994).   22 
 
'
1 f (x+z,r)=q+k’(z)                                                                                                                               (35) 
 
'
1 f (x+z,r)=p+t                                                                                                                                     (36) 
 
It follows from (35) and (36) that                                                                           
q+k’(z)= p+t                                                                                                                                        (37)  
and  
z=z(p+t-q),  / 1/ '' 0 z t k                                                                                                             (38)       
We also find from (36) that  
''
11
( ) 1 xz
tf







<0                                                                                                                              (40) 
The total consumption x+z generates an externality expressed by the the external cost function e(x+z). 
Allowing for the externality, and recalling that T=tx, social utility is  
 
() w px qz k z + ( , ) f x z r e(x+z)=v(t,r)                                                                                (41) 
where the indirect utility function v(t,r) is due to the fact that x and z are functions of t and r from (35) 
and (36).  Maximising v(t,r) w.r.t. the tax, we get the first order condition 
 
/ t v t v  ( p +
'
1( , ) f x z r -e’) / xt +(-q-k’ +
'
1( , ) f x z r -e’) / zt =0                              (42) 
Making use of the first order conditions of the consumer we can simplify to obtain  
   23 
( ') / t v t e x t '/ e z t=0                                                                                                          (43) 
 
which we can reformulate as  
 
( ' ) ( )/ e t x z t / t z t=0.                                                                                                       (44) 
 
Since  /0 zt and  ( )/ 0 x z t  the immediate implication is that t<e’. We can interpret  e’ – t  
as the un-internalised part of the cost of consuming the good. Where the externality is only partially 
internalised  (t<e’)  a tax discouragement  of  consumption  will  enhance  welfare  as  reflected  by the 
former  term  on  the  left  hand  side  which  we  interpret  as  the  marginal  benefit  of  depressing 
consumption. The latter term on the left hand side is the distortion due to the cross-border shopping 
generated by the tax wedge, and we can interpret  / t z tas a marginal social cost of reducing x+z by 
means of the tax.  
 








                                                                                                                          (45) 
 




2 / ( ' ) ( )/ ( , ) r v r v e t x z r f x z r                                                                              (46)   
 
Similar  to  the  discussion  above,  we  can  interpret  the  former  term  o n  the  right  hand  side  as  the 
marginal benefit and 
'
2( , ) f x z r as the marginal cost of the regulatory policy.  
   24 





f x z r
MC
x z r
                                                                                                                           (47) 
   
Taking an arbitrary point of departure, the more efficient instrument at the margin is the one with the 
smaller  marginal  cost  as  defined  above.  Where  regulation  always  inflicts  a  real  resource  cost  on 
society, 
'
2( , ) f x z r <0  for  all  feasible  values  of r,  and  we  can  conclude  that  if  taxation  is  not 
used 0 tr MC MC . It follows immediately that it will never be optimal to rely solely on regulation. 
The explanation is simple. A small (infinitesimal) tax will imply a negligible distortion while even a 
small regulation will inflict a finite real cost on society. A conceivable caveat is that the introduction 
of a tax may involve an administrative cost so that a “small” tax is not costless. Such a cost might 
deprive the tax of its edge over regulation but only if adopting the regulation is less costly in terms of 
administration.   
 
A further implication is that at a very low level of government intervention, the externality-alleviating 
policy will rely solely on taxation. Indeed this would be the case where the externality itself is minor.  
 
Proposition 2 
Where a tax and a costly regulation may coexist it will never be optimal to rely solely on regulation. 
At a sufficiently modest level of intervention the tax is the only instrument deployed at the optimum.  
 
Where there is a major externality, calling for extensive intervention, it is likely to be efficient to 
deploy both instruments. The optimality condition will require tr MC MC .  
 
Where t is ”large” any change in t will take place from a distorted point of departure and there is 
conceivably a sizeable marginal cost associated with using the tax alone to mitigate the externality. 
The tax imperfection due to partial enforcement implies that it is not only the regulation that entails a   25 
real cost. We note that where the tax (and price) response of cross-border shopping is (close to) 
constant the numerator of (45) is obviously increasing in t. If the demand schedule becomes steeper as 
demand declines with increasing price this effect is being reinforced. (We discuss these properties 
further below.) Unless the marginal cost of regulation is overly large, gradually increasing the tax will 
take us to a point where the marginal cost of taxation no longer falls short of the marginal cost of 
regulation, and efficiency requires that the regulation kicks in.  
 
A further question is how one would like to combine the two instruments for diminishing consumption 
beyond  the  level  where  regulation  is  adopted.  The  combination  will  then  be  determined  by  two 
conditions: t and r should be chosen such that the desirable amount of consumption (x+z) is achieved 
and  marginal  costs (defined  by  (45)  and (47))  should  be  equated.  How  marginal  cost  curves  are 
affected by changes in r ant t will then be crucial for the optimal mix. Where both marginal costs 
increase as a stricter policy is applied both instruments will be used more intensively but other cases 
are conceivable. Assume that  r MC  is constant while  t MC is increasing in t but is unaffected by r. 
Then any further reduction in consumption beyond the point where r is introduced will be achieved by 
increasing r and keeping t unchanged. Otherwise t MC  would be pushed above r MC . Where  r MC  is 
constant but the effects of both t and r are to increase  t MC  the r-instrument will be used to depress 
consumption beyond the threshold where regulation kicks in while the use of t will be scaled down as 
stricter regulation is imposed.  
 
Consider now the case where initially the tax is the only instrument in use. We may then ask how 
introducing regulation will affect the tax-setting. Note that the difference from the paragraph above is 
that the consumption level is set optimally conditional on the available tax instruments. Where the tax 
is used optimally we know from (43) that  
( ') / t v t e x t '/ e z t=0              
and the corresponding second order condition is  0 tt v . We note from (37) that z is independent of r. 
Differentiating wrt r we get         26 
( ') / '' ( ) ( ) 0 tt
dt
v t e x t e x z x z
dr r r t
.                                                             (48) 
The expression consists of three main terms. Due to the second order condition  0 tt v . We have 




may have either sign.  '' 0 e , and the last term (including the minus 
sign)  is  zero  or  negative.  We  note  that  '' 0 e   is  conducive  to  making    dt/dr  negative.   The 
interpretation is straightforward. Tighter regulation will diminish the emission and lower the marginal 
external cost implying that there is less need for the externality tax .  When regulation is tightened 




is conducive to making dt/dr <(>)0 . It follows that where  '' 0 e  dt/dr <0 if 








. The crucial factor is whether regulation 
makes domestic demand more or less price responsive. To simplify further consider the case where 
/ zt is  constant  (corresponding  to  a  quadratic  cost  function k(z),  which  is  in  fact  a  common 
assumption in the literature on cross-border shopping). Then 
( / ) ( ( )/ ) d x t d x z t
dr dr
. Where 
consumption becomes less sensitive to a price increase when there is stricter regulation the tax is used 
to a lesser extent when stricter regulation is imposed. It is commonplace to draw the demand schedule 
so that a price change has a smaller impact on demand at lower levels of consumption. If a regulation-
induced decline in demand has the same effect we would have a case for a lower tax. In general we 
cannot rule out the opposite case. Where there is a linear demand schedule ( ( )/ x z t is constant) 
regulation will have no impact on the optimal tax unless e’’>0.     
 
Proposition 3  
Let the tax be the only instrument optimally in use.  Then introducing a marginal regulation has the 
following partial effects:  
i.  a lower (higher) tax where regulation makes domestic demand less (more) sensitive to a tax 
increase,  
ii.  a lower  tax where the marginal external cost is increasing in consumption.    27 
 
Where demand is more sensitive to price the tax becomes a more efficient instrument for diminishing 
the quantity consumed and the associated externality. The externality can then be depressed more 
without creating a larger tax wedge between sources of supply.  
 
 
V. Some Further Issues 
 
So far in this paper we have confined our attention to cases where the sole objective of policy is the 
efficient control of an externality. Where the tax raises revenues these have no social value, and can be 
returned  to  individuals  in  lump-sum  payments.  The  extensive  "double  dividend"  literature
4  has, 
however, emphasised the value of the revenues derived from externality taxes, which can reduce the 
need for revenues from other tax instruments. Externality taxes may then be set with two objectives in 
mind - both alleviating externality distortions, and contributing to efficient revenue-raising. How far 
does the recognition of this second objective affect the optimal policy mix of imperfect tax and 
imperfect regulation? 
 
For considering these issues a natural starting point is the literature on the role of commodity taxes in 
an efficient revenue system. It is well known from the literature that where a distortionary income tax 
is used to raise revenue, a commodity tax (or commodity subsidy) may in some circumstances enhance 
welfare by alleviating the distortions associated with the income tax
5. Where differential taxation of 
people with different, but unobservable, earnings capacity is desirable for distributional reasons the 
income tax must be designed subject to the self-selection constraint that the more productive agents do 
not mimic the less able, and distortions are mitigated by softening this constraint.  The alleviation 
naturally comes at a cost since differential commodity taxation distorts the choice of consumption 
                                                 
4 See Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for an overview 
5 An important insight underpinning this literature is the observation that a commodity tax only adds to the fiscal 
possibilities offered by an income tax to the extent that it taxes goods at different rates; a uniform tax on all 
consumption is equivalent to a uniform tax on income.   28 
bundle. A number of papers
6 have discussed this issue making various assumptions about the income 
tax, and have shown that assumptions about the structure of consumer preferences are crucial for the 
use of commodity taxes to enhance the efficiency of revenue-raising.  The key issue is the relationship 
between commodity demands and labour supply. Where these interact, then, roughly -speaking, 
commodities that are related to leisure should be taxed at high rates while work -related commodities 
should be taxed less (or subsidised) in order to mitigate labour supply distortions. These policy rules 
may, however, need to be adjusted once the role of some commodities in generating externalities is 
recognised
7. Pirtillä and Tuomala (1997) show that, where environmental quality and l eisure are 
complements, a deterioration in environmental quality can alleviate the self -selection constraint on 
income taxation, suggesting that the externality tax might then be set lower than would be optimal in 
the absence of revenue-raising and distributional considerations. 
 
This strand of literature confines its attention to optimal tax analysis and does not consider the use of 
regulation. Since the objective of minimising the distortionary cost of revenue -raising prevents the 
commodity tax from being tailored perfectly to the Pigouvian objective of minimising external costs, it 
might seem that the addition of a further instrument in the form of regulation would ease the constraint 
on the attainment of both objectives. This may conceivably be the case  with certain forms of 
regulation. But with the type of regulation considered above  - which acts to increase the costs of 
obtaining each unit consumed - the additional instrument is not likely to be of help
8.  The reason is that 
it is the real choice of consumption bundle that matters. It is the encouragement or discouragement of 
the consumption of specific commodities that affects labour supply. Whether this is achieved by using 
taxes or regulation is immaterial to the impact on the self-selection constraint on income taxation, but 
there may be a difference in the cost of achieving the outcome. The main social cost of taxation is to 
distort the consumption bundle but  regulation will do the same. Beyond these similar effects,  
                                                 
6 For instance Corlett and Hague (1953), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Christiansen (1984). 
7 Crawford et al (2009), in a paper for the Mirrlees Review, discuss which (positive or negative) commodities 
taxes that should supplement income taxes based also on empirical findings. The authors note that the "list of 
commodities includes some associated with pollution and other externalities, which might have implication for 
tax rates tempering those arising from the issues of preference structure addressed here”. 
8 We develop this formally in Christiansen and Smith (2008).   29 
regulation is likely to impose a larger burden on consumers as it works by inflicting a loss of utility for 
any given consumption bundle as discussed above. It follows that this kind of regulation will be 




VI  Conclusions 
 
Information asymmetries and costs of administration may give rise to imperfections in both externality 
taxes and direct regulation. Used alone, neither instrument may be capable of achieving the most 
efficient reduction in external costs, and a more efficient outcome may be achieved by combined use 
of multiple instruments. This paper looks at the economic issues which arise when externality taxes 
and direct regulation are used in parallel. It explores the properties of two simple models of imperfect 
tax and imperfect regulation, reflecting different form of imperfection in the tax instrument. 
 
The focus of the paper is on externalities arising from individuals’ consumption decisions. A number 
of such externalities are affected by the kinds of instrument inefficiency we describe. Taxes on the sale 
of alcoholic drinks or tobacco products, for example, can only roughly approximate the externalities 
generated by their consumption. Likewise the available forms of regulation, such as the recent ban on 
smoking in public places in many European countries, are not precisely targeted to the underlying 
external costs. 
 
Regulation may affect consumption behaviour in a number of ways. We suggest that for a number of 
consumer externalities it may be useful to think of regulation as an increase in the cost to consumers of 
obtaining the good (for example, where the sale of alcoholic drinks is limited to a small number of 
outlets). Regulation thus has effects which are similar to - but not equivalent to - an increase in price. 
It will be seen that the representation of regulation here differs sharply from the emission limits or 
technology mandates typically considered when analysing the regulation of industrial emissions.   30 
 
Section 3 considered a case where an externality tax cannot be adequately differentiated to reflect 
differences in the external costs from different units consumed. Costs may differ between individuals, 
or between consumption in different contexts, and yet the tax is constrained to be uniform. We show 
that in this situation the outcome can be improved by direct regulation of consumption generating the 
larger external cost. The optimal externality tax rate in this context takes the same form as the well-
known weighted average formula of Diamond (1973). How it is affected by the addition of regulation 
will  depend  on  how  marginal  external  costs  and  the  price  responsiveness  of  demand  vary  with 
consumption. Where these are constant, tighter regulation has no effect on the optimal tax, but if the 
marginal external effect is increasing in consumption and if regulation does not increase the price-
responsiveness of demand for the regulated activity, adding regulation reduces the optimal externality 
tax rate. 
 
Section 4 considered a contrasting case where the tax exhibits undesirable differentiation - for example 
where some consumption escapes the externality tax, by being purchased in low-tax countries abroad 
or on the black market. Where this happens, an externality-motivated commodity tax will distort the 
choice between different sources of supply and the resulting excess burden will be increasing in the 
tax rate. We show that the optimal policy mix will depend on the scale of intervention required. Where 
there is a major externality it will, as before, be optimal to deploy both instruments, set at a level to 
equate the marginal cost per unit reduction in consumption from each instrument. However, although 
both instruments are imperfect, combined use will not always be optimal. We demonstrate that in 
cases where the externality is small, it will be efficient to control externality effects using the tax 
alone,  and  it  will  never  be  optimal  to  rely  solely  on  regulation.  The  intuition  for  this  result  is 
straightforward:  regulation  always  inflicts  a  finite  real  resource  cost  on  society,  while  a  small 
(infinitesimal) tax involves negligible distortion. 
 
We  then  consider  the  implications  of  introducing  regulation,  starting  from  a  situation  where  the 
externality is controlled through the use of a tax alone. In this situation, the addition of regulation may   31 
raise or lower the optimal tax. As before, these effects will depend on how marginal external costs and 
the price responsiveness of demand vary with consumption. Adding regulation will reduce the optimal 
tax where regulation reduces the sensitivity of demand to the tax, and/or where the marginal external 
cost is increasing in consumption. 
 
Our models have in common that using the tax to internalise an externality is costly because it it is 
distortionary in some other respect. In the former model, increasing the tax to alleviate the more 
serious externality will over-internalise the weaker externality. In the latter model a larger tax will 
better internalise the externality but will increase the locational distortion. We note that in both models 
sensitivity of demand is crucial to the effect of tighter regulation on the optimal externality tax In the 
first model the tax is a more (less) efficient instrument for diminishing the externality where the 
demand causing the more serious externality becomes more (less) price sensitive in response to the 
regulation.  In  the  second  model  more  price  responsive  domestic  demand  makes  the  tax  a  more 
efficient instrument for diminishing the quantity consumed and the associated externality. With larger 
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